The rise of China is the most important development in East Asia in recent times. It presents major opportunities and challenges, if not threats, for ASEAN as a collective entity, and for the individual countries that compose it. Whether ASEAN can develop a collective, let alone effective response is far from clear. This paper explores and analyses the forces that are likely to determine the outcome.
Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) occupies a prominent place in the studies of regional organisations, especially those in what is still referred to sometimes as the "developing world". For a long time ASEAN had few parallels or competitors for the title of the most effective institution outside of "the West" generally, or Western Europe more particularly. Consequently, ASEAN has received a good deal of analytical attention and has attracted highly divergent views in the process. For some observers -perhaps most famously Amitav Acharya (Acharya 2000 (Acharya , 2004 -ASEAN is an example of the potential influence that Southeast Asian states can exert over their more powerful peers when acting collectively. For other scholars, ASEAN is noteworthy primarily as a mechanism for avoiding rather than resolving problems (Jones and Smith 2007) . Both arguments have merits. One way of trying to resolve which side of the debate has the most credibility is to test whether they can explain specific challenges. Fortunately for the scholarly community, but less so for ASEAN, such a challenge is at hand.
The so-called "rise of China" presents arguably the most formidable policy challenge ASEAN has faced (Beeson 2010) . Even the financial crisis of the late 1990s may come to be seen as short-term and relatively minor by comparison. The sheer scale and complexity of its growing impact across a number of policy domains means that China's reemergence as the major power in the East Asian region is not only likely to transform Southeast Asia's relations with China, but also perhaps the internal relations of ASEAN itself (Storey 2013) . At the very least, it will be a major test of the effectiveness of the so-called "ASEAN Way" and its ability to manage international relations within Southeast Asia, as well as the East Asian region more broadly. In what follows, I provide an analysis of the competing policy imperatives that are pulling ASEAN's members in different directions as they attempt to come to terms with China's rise. 1 Consequently, I suggest that ASEAN will have difficulty maintaining a sense of unity or collective purpose. The reality is that 1 Acknowledgements: The paper benefitted from a one-month fellowship at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS) and from discussions with FRIAS's Southeast Asian Studies group. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Dynamic Alignments and Dealignments in Global Southeast Asia conference at the Freiburg Institute of Advanced Studies, 24-26 June 2015. The support of FRIAS is gratefully acknowledged. Research for the paper was also supported by funding from the Australian Research Council: DP 150100217. Finally, the author wishes to thank JCSAA's anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.
while ASEAN is hamstrung by the relative ineffectiveness of its own internal political practices and norms, it is also being divided by the very country to which it seeks to respond. In other words, an effective, coherent, consistent and collective response to the challenge of China is likely to prove beyond ASEAN's abilities. To develop this argument, I start by reviewing the competing geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives that are pulling the ASEAN grouping's members in different directions. In part, this is a function of Southeast Asia's particular geographical and historical circumstances; the simple fact is that the individual histories and priorities of the ASEAN members have made agreement on a common position unlikely and inherently difficult. Developing a common position would be difficult under any circumstances, but this difficulty is compounded by the weakness of the ASEAN as a potential collective actor. The limitations and restrictive influence of the ASEAN Way -distinctive norms designed to encourage cooperation and minimise conflict -are exemplified by the operation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While the ARF ought to be supremely well placed to play a pivotal role in managing the wider Asia-Pacific region's security affairs, it remains marginal and ineffective because of the influence of the ASEAN Way.
Geopolitics, Geoeconomics and History
In some ways, the times ought to suit ASEAN. After all, Southeast Asia has been largely peaceful since the end of the Vietnam War; even those conflicts that have occurred have been relatively confined and have not threatened the security of the region as a whole. Indeed, admirers of ASEAN's diplomatic culture frequently point to the organisation's role in resolving the "Cambodian crisis" as its finest hour and a vindication of the ASEAN Way of consensus, consultation and cooperation (Askandar, Bercowtch, and Oishi 2002) . Some go even further and attribute the "long peace of Asia" to the influence of ASEAN and its normative practices (Kivimäki 2014; for critique, see Beeson 2015) . Other observers of a more Realist disposition note that if the key great powers (China and the United States) had not also been interested in reaching a resolution to the crisis, all of ASEAN's efforts would have been in vain (Jones and Smith 2001) . In other words, ASEAN's much-vaunted capacity to provide regional leadership and be "in the driving seat" was entirely dependent on a fortuitous coincidence of interests.
As we shall see, these sorts of debates and diametrically opposed opinions are endemic to ASEAN scholarship. What can be said with some confidence, however, is that "structural" constraints and the actions of regional and extra-regional great powers have loomed large throughout ASEAN's entire historical experience. In fact, ASEAN's original emergence was, in large part, a consequence of the very challenging geopolitical environment that prevailed in the wider East Asian region during the Cold War (Narine 2002) . There a direct confrontation between the capitalist and communist camps in the region, which also threatened to directly impact on the newly independent and still insecure regimes of Southeast Asia. It is not necessary to subscribe to the socalled "domino theory" of communist expansion in Southeast Asia to recognise that these were highly febrile and uncertain times for small states in particular (Beeson 2013) .
However, the more recent international environment has been rather different and potentially beneficial from ASEAN's point of view. The 1990s in particular saw what Edward Luttwak described as a noteworthy shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics (Luttwak 1990 ). In the aftermath of the Cold War, which had had such a constraining influence on the ASEAN states, the structural transformation of the international system seemed to open up new possibilities for the conduct of international relations. At the very least, greater emphasis was given to the "low" politics of economic development, instead of the traditional preoccupation with security (Baldwin 1985) . Given ASEAN's limited ability to determine conventional balance of power outcomes, its "balance of influence" approach should have come into its own at this moment (Ciorciari 2009) . In reality, a number of the ASEAN states have increasingly fallen back on a more traditional "hedging" strategy, in which the possible strategic threat posed by China's rise is offset by reinforcing security relations with the United States (Kuik 2008) .
It is no coincidence that the 1990s saw the emergence of constructivism as an influential way of thinking about and accounting for important outcomes in international relations (Adler 1997) . As the influence of geopolitical constraints and the logic of superpower confrontation seemed to retreat, ideas and norms appeared to exert a more powerful influence over the behaviour of states -or, more accurately, policymakers (Ba 2009a) . Indeed, at the same time as Realist-inspired international relations practice seemed to be less consequential, so too did Realist international relations theory (Legro and Moravcsik 1999) . This led to growing efforts to explain ASEAN's surprisingly prominent role in the wider Asia-Pacific region's efforts at institutional innovation (He 2006; Eaton and Stubbs 2006) . One of the more important and innovative efforts in this regard was provided by the concept of "institutionalised hedging", in which institutions became a way of "balancing against" more powerful states. The implication of this strategy, of course, is that "many of the new institutions in the Asia Pacific are more devices for institutional balancing than for problem solving" (Rüland 2011: 99) .
Both of these ways of thinking about the nature of balancing and hedging are illuminating. It is striking that both realists and constructivists have important and insightful things to say about the way security is conceived and realised in the East Asian region. It is precisely because of the complex, multi-dimensional nature of what has been described as the "regional security complex" (Buzan and Waever 2003) that Katzenstein and Sil have argued that we must adopt an analytically eclectic approach to understanding security in Asia (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 1-33) . As ever, the challenge is deciding how much causal weight to attach to material and ideational variables. The principal conclusion that emerges from consideration of ASEAN's historical development is that such factors vary over time and are not pre-determined or immutable. On the contrary, ASEAN in particular has demonstrated a capacity to take advantage of changing geopolitical conditions in ways that seem at odds with the structural constraints that have sometimes defined the organisation.
Institutional Innovation and the ASEAN Way
For the first few decades after the Second World War, even after ASEAN's establishment in 1967, regional institutions outside of Western Europe were mainly notable for their absence. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a growing interest in developing regional institutions to perform various tasks and/or to coordinate the actions of regional states (Green and Gill 2009) . For a region that is generally associated with low levels of regionalism, East Asia and/or the Asia-Pacific have become synonymous with regional innovation. Indeed, one could argue that a key problem facing the more broadly conceived Asia-Pacific region has been the existence of too many regional initiatives with overlapping mandates and claims to authority; this is something that has fundamentally undermined the very idea of a more expansive "AsiaPacific" region as a coherent entity (Beeson 2006) . While this would have been a problem in itself, the operating style of most of the organisations has been drawn from the ASEAN model, which has further undermined the potential effectiveness of these nascent organisations.
The main problem in this regard has arguably been the ASEAN Way itself. While the ASEAN Way may have made sense when the grouping was founded, it is debatable whether it still does. When the challenge was to bring together a highly disparate group of countries with a history of intramural conflict, a set of diplomatic practices with which members felt comfortable and unthreatened was certainly attractive and perhaps necessary to ensure agreement. The problem is that while the ASEAN Way's principles of non-interference in internal affairs, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and a prohibition on the use of force may be understandable, even admirable, they have proved an obstacle to effective cooperation. The emphasis on consensus, not losing face and voluntarism has meant that the politics of the lowest common denominator has tended to prevail and difficult problems have been avoided rather than confronted.
ASEAN's inability to influence the behaviour of its own members, much less that of the superpowers, has been clear for some time. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which provided a code of conduct and guide to behaviour for member states, depended on individual states taking its precepts and norms seriously. While the TAC included a provision that the "ASEAN High Council would resolve intramural disputes", the High Council has never actually been convened and participants could potentially veto its actions even if it was convened. The key point here could be that, for all the potential attractions of multilateral cooperation and institution building, such processes can only be meaningful if the institutional mechanisms themselves are effective and members share a genuine commitment to their underlying logic (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009; Ruggie 1992) . Such commitments have generally been absent in Southeast Asia (Acharya and Johnston 2007: 32-82) . Arguably the most consequential exemplar of the constraining impact of the ASEAN Way can be found in the ASEAN Regional Forum.
The ASEAN Regional Forum
If ever an organisation appeared to be in the right place at the right time, it is the ARF. It is has become a cliché in international relations scholarship on East Asia to say that the region is home to some of the world's most potentially combustible and seemingly irreconcilable "flashpoints". Whether it is the divisions on the Korean peninsula, the problematic status of Taiwan or (as we shall below) the unresolved territorial claims in the South China Sea, the East Asian region has many strategic questions that need addressing. An organisation that includes all of the main players in the region's various security challenges would presumably be well placed to help address them. In reality, however, the ARF has typi-cally been an ineffectual bystander and exerted very little influence in efforts to resolve the region's manifold security problems. The principal reason for this can be traced to the counterproductive influence of ASEAN-style diplomacy.
The ARF in Context
The origins of the ARF tell us something important about ASEAN itself. Like ASEAN, the ARF was a product of wider structural changes in the international system. In the ARF's case, however, it was not so much the pressure exerted by a seemingly implacable and permanent bipolar order that was decisive. Moments of what Andrew Hurrell calls "hegemonic compression" can open up new possibilities and create a new pattern of international relations (Hurrell 2006) . One of the things that emerged in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War was a new focus on geoeconomics. In the context of a restructured international order emerged a renewed interest in international institutions among policymakers, which reflected and built on the growing theoretical interest in regimes and institutions of the 1980s (Keohane 1984) . What was noteworthy about the more encompassing Asia-Pacific region, and even the more geographically coherent East Asian region, was the relative absence of effective institutions of any sort. This was especially true with regard to groupings designed to manage an increasingly fluid structure of regional and international power (Narine 2004; Beeson 2014) . Although the open-ended nature of this moment may have been relatively brief and snuffed out by the unilateralism of George W. Bush (Prestowitz 2003) , a number of important regional institutions emerged while it lasted, not least of which was the ARF.
Significantly, the impetus for the ARF -albeit ideational rather than structural -came from outside the ASEAN grouping (Yuzawa 2012) . Both Canada and Australia proposed developing an Asia-Pacific version of the Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE). In a recurring theme for the region, the ASEAN countries were not keen to adopt proposals that had their origins outside the region. One of the continuing opinions in Southeast Asia is that ASEAN ought to remain at the centre of the region's institution-building efforts. Consequently, threats to ASEAN's notional centrality have been met coolly (Lee and Milner 2014) . To ensure ASEAN cooperation in any putative organisational initiative, it is necessary to subscribe to the ASEAN Way of doing things. Therefore, the ARF and other regional projects such as the largely ineffective Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping have had to operate on the basis of cooperation, consensus and voluntarism (Beeson and Stubbs 2012: 350-363) . It is a measure of just how disappointing ARF's achievements have been that even one of its original instigators now suggests that the ARF is still "largely stuck in its original groove -dialogue about confidence building -rather than living up to the hopes that it would by now be doing something more substantial" (Evans 2015) .
As with APEC, the ARF grouping has not met the hopes of some of its champions. Also like APEC, states such as Japan played a role behind the scenes in promoting a concept that might otherwise not have been realised. However, it is equally significant and revealing that Japan has subsequently lost confidence in the ARF's ability to actually achieve even its relatively modest agenda of developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) and preventive diplomacy (Yuzawa 2005; Emmers and Tan 2011) . This record of limited achievement and influence is partly explained in part by the ARF membership's lukewarm support of greater transparency and in part by a shift to a greater focus on non-traditional security issues during the 1990s. The privileging of non-traditional security has been driven by both the comparative failure of the ARF's original agenda and by the fact that terrorism assumed such a high priority in the aftermath of September 11 attacks on the US (Yuzawa 2012) . If nothing else, the ARF has played a role in keeping the US strategically and institutionally engaged in the region in a way that a majority of ASEAN members find reassuring in the rapidly changing regional security environment.
And yet, even in the arguably less demanding and politically fraught area of non-traditional security cooperation, cooperation has been has been limited, piecemeal and undermined by a lack of state capacity and mutual trust. Such progress as there has been has primarily involved disaster relief. Within the narrower ASEAN grouping itself, however, it has sometimes not only appeared capable of acting but was also prepared to violate its apparently sacrosanct principle of non-intervention (Jones 2012) . Although Australian troops may have done most of the heavy lifting during the crisis in what was then East Timor, a number of other ASEAN states played a role in encouraging Indonesia to "internationalise" the management of the crisis.
Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the crisis in Timor illustrates the contingent nature of ASEAN's diplomacy. On the one hand, there are clearly examples of ASEAN states violating the sovereignty of member states and "interfering" in domestic affairs. On the other hand, it is also evident that this is generally only undertaken in extremis and when the alternatives seem even worse. The potential blow to ASEAN's credibility if it completely failed to act would have been substantial (Dupont 2000) . More importantly for the purposes of the present discussion, there is virtually no evidence of the larger, ASEAN-inspired ARF grouping doing anything similar, despite the existence of a number of compelling and intensifying security challenges across the region. Before considering how key regional actors and institutions have responded to regional security challenges, however, it is important to say something about the rise of China, which has done more than anything else to transform expectations about the future of regional security.
The Rise of China
It is hard to overstate the significance of the so-called 'rise of China'. Even the way in which we describe this unprecedented and economic and latterly strategic transformation is loaded with significance (Glaser and Medeiros 2007; Zheng 2005) . China has been at pains to assure its neighbours that its rise is peaceful, and much more of an opportunity than a threat as far as Southeast Asia in particular is concerned. Nevertheless, it is understandable why the much smaller ASEAN economies might feel threatened by the rapid re-emergence of their giant neighbour at the centre of East Asian region's economic and strategic order (Beeson 2013) . This was apparent at the height of China's so-called "charm offensive". In the wake of China's increasingly assertive policy toward its territorial claims in the South China Sea, however, concerns among some of ASEAN's maritime states in particular have reached fever pitch. Before considering why China's recent actions are proving so contentious and potentially destabilising, it is worth making a few brief remarks about China's historical role in Asia.
China in Context
The main point about China's rise is that it represents a return to a longstanding historical pattern, rather than an unprecedented regional phenomenon. While it is true that the precise nature of China's engagement with East and Southeast Asia is of an entirely different order and scope, the idea that China might be the most powerful actor in the region is hardly new. On the contrary, China occupied a dominant position in a distinctive hierarchical order in what we now think of as East Asia for hundreds of years. The tribute system that symbolised this order was not only an important symbolic manifestation of China's ascendancy (Ringmar 2012) but was also instrumental in maintaining stability in the region as a whole. Indeed, for some observers, a "strong" China is not necessarily threatening but rather a potential source of stability (Kang 2003) .
This thesis looked entirely plausible for some time. In particular, the so-called "charm offensive" and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) (Kurlantzick 2007; Chin and Stubbs 2011) made it appear that China was prepared to go to great lengths and endure some economic cost to persuade its Southeast Asian neighbours that it could be trusted and that its new regional prominence could potentially be a good thing for the region. In some ways, the ASEAN states had little choice but to accept the fact that China had rapidly become the most important trade partner for the overwhelming majority of East Asian states -and many others besides (Das 2009 ). The extent of ASEAN's growing reliance on China as a key trade partner can be seen in Tables 1  and 2. As Table 1 indicates, China is now by far the largest trading partner for the ASEAN grouping as a whole. Moreover, China is particularly important for ASEAN states such as Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and especially Burma/Myanmar, as can be seen in Table 2 . It is no surprise, therefore, that these countries are often amongst China's strongest supporters within ASEAN and that such ties represent one of the principal obstacles to achieving consensus on a coherent ASEAN response to China's actions in the South China Sea. The long-term structural transformation and greater integration of the region's economies has meant that the ASEAN states have arguably had little alternative than to maintain a good working relationship with their principal trade partner. What made this scenario more palatable, however, were the lengths to which China was prepared to go to ingratiate itself with the ASEAN states. ACFTA, in which the Chinese side promised an "early harvest" of unilateral market opening to the ASEAN economies, has been described as a "masterstroke" of Chinese diplomacy (Ravenhill 2010) . In exchange for relatively minimal economic pain, China was able to enhance its status as a good, responsible actor in the region's economic affairs. Of course, China had already demonstrated its importance and reliability during the Asian financial crisis when it resisted the temptation to devalue its own currency and add to the economic and political mayhem (Kirshner 2003: 153-171) . China has also been an important part of new regional initiatives that are designed to encourage economic cooperation, shield the region from future crises or generally reinforce the "Asian" part of East Asian regionalism (Beeson and Li 2014) . Despite serious doubts about the effectiveness of such initiatives (Emmers and Ravenhill 2011) , it seemed -for a while, at least -as if some of China's grand strategic ambitions, especially the goal of re-establishing itself at the centre of regional affairs, were going to be realised. However, the rosy picture looks a good deal darker, and China's rise is contributing to "indirect balancing" strategies that have predicated a continuing, even enhanced, American commitment to the region (Goh 2008) . For this transformation in its fortunes and reputation, China is primarily to blame.
The Return of Geopolitics
For realists, there is nothing surprising about the idea that China's leaders seem to have abandoned Deng Xiaoping's famous axiom about keeping a low diplomatic profile, and have unapologetically thrust themselves into the international spotlight. According to the likes of Robert Kaplan and, perhaps most famously, John Mearsheimer, such behaviour is the entirely predictable outcome of shifts in the distribution of power in the international system (Kaplan 2012; Mearsheimer 2010 Mearsheimer , 2001 ). For Mearsheimer in particular, China's behaviour is actually uncannily like America's enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, which provided the basis for its regional hegemony on the American continent (Walt 2013; Mearsheimer 2006) . In short, asserting themselves as the dominant force in their immediate neighbourhoods is what great powers do, given half a chance.
It is not necessary to embrace the implicit teleology of such views, or accept all of the theoretical claims of hegemonic transition theory, in order to recognise that China's recent behaviour seems to fit the realist bill (Chan 2008; Beeson 2009 ). There is no doubt that China is adopting a more assertive posture and many observers argue that if China could push the US out of the region, this would be an entirely agreeable outcome (Friedberg 2011) . However, most ASEAN states would find this an entirely unwelcome prospect and one that could leave them even more exposed to China's increasingly assertive behaviour in the region (Medeiros 2005 (Medeiros -2006 . As ever, reading the intentions of both the US and China is a vital task, and doing so is not made easier by the opaque nature of the policymaking process in China in particular. Even in the US, frequent changes in policy and administrations and the long-term erosion of American primacy have raised doubts about America's commitment to the region that first began to emerge in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the enunciation of yet another strategic doctrine by Richard Nixon.
Barack Obama's "pivot" back to the Asia-Pacific region is clearly a response to the rise of China as a strategic actor, although it has not entirely convinced some of America's allies. Even within the US itself, critics have lined up to criticise the Obama administration's policy in the Asia-Pacific generally and toward China in particular (Friedberg 2012; Blackwill and Tellis 2015) . The US is frequently criticised for having neglected East Asia in favour of more pressing strategic challenges in the Middle East (Ba 2009b) . Even when the US has attempted to give greater substance to its strategic rhetoric and reassure nervous allies about its intentions, serious doubts have been raised about American capabilities (Dobbins 2012) . These doubts are partly a consequence of China's own growing military capabilities and the development of comparatively cheap and effective weapons systems such as anti-ship missile technologies that directly threaten America's continuing presence in the region (Newmyer 2010) . They are also partly a function of widespread concerns about America's continuing ability to finance adequately the cost of power projection in the region. The fact that the US relies on continuing inflows of capital from China to underpin its own economic position and, ultimately, to finance its own strategic commitments is taken as another indicator of relative decline (Layne 2012; Stokes 2013; Schweller and Pu 2011) .
If America's strategic intentions are proving difficult for both friends and potential foes to read, China's are even more opaque (Jakobson and Knox 2010). One of the key issues is who is actually in charge of the policy-making process in China, and whether Chinese foreign and strategic policy is actually a product of a coherent, long-term "grand strategy", or whether it is the ad hoc, improvised and ultimately unpredictable consequence of the intersection and efforts of multiple centres of power and influence in China itself. Evidence can be found to support both of these hypotheses and -as is often the way with such things -the reality probably contains elements of each. On the one hand, Xi Jinping is undoubtedly the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, if not Mao Zedong (Economy 2014) . It is difficult to imagine that anything as consequential as China's -at times aggressive -policies in the South China Sea could be contemplated, much less enacted without his implicit or explicit approval. On the other hand, there is no doubt that, at the margins of the policymaking process -especially as far as day-to-day operations are concerned -there is a good deal of scope for "policy freelancing" by interested parties in various domains.
It would be difficult enough for the ASEAN states to act effectively if Chinese policy was consistent. But over the last few years in particular, Chinese policy toward Southeast Asia has veered from charming to alarming in a remarkably short space of time (Beeson and Li 2014) . At the height of the so-called charm offensive, it seemed as if China was determined to make a major effort to reassure the ASEAN states. Over the last few years, however, Chinese policy toward the highly contentious, unresolved and conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea has become increasingly belligerent (Fravel 2011) . While it is difficult to be certain, it seems that a major long-term change of policy direction has been made and presumably authorised at the highest levels in China. The net effect has been to engender a state of alarm and disunity among the ASEAN states (Callick 2014) . Just how divisive China's rise has been was revealed in 2012 when the grouping acrimoniously disagreed over how to respond to the territorial disputes, with mainland Cambodia openly siding with China ahead of its maritime fellow ASAEN states (Storey 2012) .
ASEAN's divergent responses to China's rise have their origins in history, geography and the different calculations each member makes about the possible balance of threats and opportunities that emerge from China's rise. The dispute between China and some of its neighbours over rival territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) have highlighted ASEAN's divisions most dramatically. As Simon observes:
ASEAN states take varying positions on the SCS dispute: Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma) lean toward China; Malaysia and Indonesia are cautious about U.S. involvement; Thailand and Singapore are neutral; while both Vietnam and the Philippines welcome an American role (Simon 2012: 997 ).
China's own policies have reinforced the fundamental division between the maritime states that are directly in conflict with China, on one hand, and the rest of the grouping, which is more focused on the possible economic advantages of China's rise, on the other. Burma, Laos and especially Cambodia have recently had close ties to China, which China has reinforced with effective diplomacy and more tangible forms of aid and investment (Chen and Yang 2013; Storey 2013) . In Cambodia's case, "China has effectively bought Cambodia's loyalty" (Heng 2012: 77) . This is not to say that ASEAN has not tried to use diplomacy to try and establish an institutional framework with which to manage its increasingly problematic relationship with China. On the contrary, it has. Discussions revolving around the so-called Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) have been underway since 2002 (Thayer 2012) . However, as is the way of such things, there has been a good deal of talk but very little in the way of specific proposals, much less agreements, that would compel all parties to accept a binding code of conduct (Moss 2014) . The Philippines government, perhaps the ASEAN state with the most at stake in these disputes, declared in 2013 that the process of dialogue and consultation was effectively "exhausted". In the meantime, China's island building and "land reclamation" efforts have continued to gather pace, effectively transforming the facts on the ground and dividing ASEAN in the process (Otto and Ng 2015) .
The Paradoxes of Chinese Policy
The reality of the asymmetrical relationship between China and Southeast Asia was revealed -perhaps with unintentional candour -by former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi. Yang stunned the Southeast Asian nations at the 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi by declaring that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact" (Kurlantzick 2011 ). While such a statement is no doubt true, it is hardly in keeping with ASEAN's preferred mode of face-saving and issue avoidance. Even more consequentially, this unvarnished statement of what the Chinese plainly perceive as geopolitical reality is diametrically at odds with the fiction that the ASEAN countries are "in the driving seat" and filling the region's purported leadership vacuum. The undeniable leadership vacuum in East Asia is a product of the region's distinct and often bloody history -a possibility starkly illustrated by the continuing tensions and rivalry between China and Japan. What should perhaps be emphasised is that while northeast Asia's problems may be partly attributable to the absence of effective multilateral institutions (Rozman 2004) , their existence in Southeast Asia is no guarantee of harmonious relations or an enhanced problem-solving capacity either.
China's new geopolitical assertiveness and intransigence is fuelled by a number of factors. First, and most compellingly, the stakes in the South China Sea are incredibly high. While no one knows precisely how much oil and gas (not to mention protein) may be available in the region, it could be vast and is clearly a major driver of Chinese policy (Collins and Erikson 2011: 15-28) . This would be significant at any time; in an era of dwindling natural resources and insatiable demand for energy it is critical (Klare 2008 ) -especially for a government whose authority and legitimacy is almost entirely dependent on continuing economic growth (Yang and Zhao 2014) . In addition, there is a growing tide of chauvinistic nationalism in China that makes compromise and backtracking by its leaders politically difficult, if not dangerous (Shi 2015; Wong 2014) . Having made such strident assertions about the legitimacy of its rather implausible looking territorial claims, it will be very hard for any government leader in China to backtrack now without an enormous, possibly career-ending loss of face.
In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the competing Chinese and Southeast Asian positions can be reconciled. China seems irrevocably committed to asserting what it sees as its legitimate claims, even in the face of increasingly forceful declarations from the US about the importance of freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and its willingness to support key allies such as Japan in the event of any conflict in the region (Entous, Lubold, and Barnes 2015) . It even appears as though the fact that a number of key Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines and even Vietnam have been moving to reinforce their strategic ties to the US has done little to diminish China's determination to pursue its own strategic goals. In this regard, ASEAN faces a potentially irreconcilable conflict of its own: the normal ASEAN Way of endless meetings and discussions in the expectation that socialisation will occur and agreement will eventually emerge is potentially playing into China's hands (Otto and Ng 2015) . As China continues to reinforce its material presence on the ground, it will become increasingly difficult for ASEAN to change the existing material reality, or for China to back down.
Adding to ASEAN's difficulties is the fact that China's foreign policy continues to operate on multiple levels, despite the recent emphasis on provocative direct action and belligerence. At the same time as China is assertively reinforcing its territorial claims, it is simultaneously promot-ing the idea of a new institutional architecture with which to provide badly needed infrastructure investment across the region. As part of its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China's policymakers are seeking to realise a grandiose reconstruction of former trade links that were formerly centred on China. Significantly for ASEAN, these plans also include a so-called Maritime Silk Road that promises to provide new transport infrastructure throughout Southeast Asia (Zhang 2015) . Equally importantly, China has established a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with which to finance these new projects (Pilling 2015; Pitlo 2015) . For Southeast Asian countries with little at stake in the territorial disputes and potentially much to gain from this new source of funding, ASEAN solidarity may be put to a searching test.
Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that ASEAN's continuing existence has helped to improve relations between the members of the grouping. Although it may be difficult to quantify or demonstrate precise causal relationships, it is not unreasonable to infer that the endless meetings and the constant interaction between senior officials and leaders have helped to build a sense of confidence and a degree of solidarity. Even if this has not often translated into specific agreements with tangible outcomes, the process itself clearly matters (Acharaya 2011) . Indeed, as Jürgen Rüland (2014: 246) noted, Southeast Asia's distinctive form of regionalisation is ultimately "less an institutional device for solving cross-border problems through collective action, than for strengthening the region's nation states through regional resilience". Accordingly, there are good reasons for not lightly dismissing an organisation that has been around for so long and is generally taken seriously by its members. Yet, there are mounting challenges that demand the sort of immediate, collective and effective responses that ASEAN has generally not been good at. There are even growing signs of division within the ASEAN grouping itself as the membership struggles to come to terms with certain issues, most notably the rise of China. The Philippines has become especially exercised about ASEAN's inability to demonstrate solidarity in the face of a looming external threat from a much more powerful state. This failing is especially revealing when we remember that this was largely the (unofficial) raison d'être for establishing ASEAN in the first place (Lifer 1989) .
Therefore, China's rise poses an existential challenge for ASEAN. If the grouping cannot respond to what it is arguably the most significant challenge since its inauguration nearly half a century ago, then even sympathetic observers might reasonably question its relevance and purpose. China, by contrast, has been able to deftly divide and rule, taking advantage of ASEAN's internal division, while simultaneously transforming the very geography of the region ASEAN claims to represent. To be sure, there are aspects of China's current foreign and security policies that look counter-productive and contrary to its declarations about the benefits of its rise. Nonetheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that at least some influential Chinese policymakers have made a judgment that the ASEAN grouping can do little to stop its assertive actions in the South China Sea.
When seen in the longer-term sweep of regional history and geopolitics, ASEAN's record looks rather underwhelming and does not suggest that it will be able to collectively rise to the challenge posed by China. On the contrary, in the 50 years since its inauguration, ASEAN's principal achievement could be its continued existence. In many ways its capacity to actually influence the behaviour of its members, much less that of some of the more powerful states in the Asia-Pacific, looks less certain than it did in 1967. At that time, at least, ASEAN solidarity was actually promoted by the imperatives of geopolitics and geoeconomics; now, the same forces are exposing divisions and conflicting goals among the membership. If the organisation is to have any relevance during the next 50 years, the rise of China is one challenge the grouping may be unable to avoid.
